More Autonomy for Donor Organizations & Their Agents (Sometimes): Bringing Organizational Behavior and Management Theory to Foreign Aid Delivery

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ABSTRACT

Management practice is the low-hanging fruit of foreign aid delivery, the area where marginal investment is most likely to yield results. Leveraging over 100 in-person interviews and econometric analysis of the world's largest database of development projects (over 14,000 projects over 40 years), which I have assembled, I argue that for some (but not all) foreign aid tasks the move towards output measurement and away from field agent autonomy is likely to be detrimental to performance. More generally I argue that there is inadequate attention paid in foreign aid to applying the rich, evidence-based literature on organizational behavior and optimal performance; there is good reason to believe we can greatly improve the impact of aid simply by thinking more deeply about how organizational structure affects performance and how optimal structure is a function of recipient country context and the specific task being undertaken. Much attention and treasure is spent on elements of the development equation that, while very important, are not terribly tractable to external intervention (e.g. political will, corruption) It is high time that we concentrate on the levers of development that *are* fully within the control of aid donors and we have reason to believe are also significant determinants of outcome: management, incentives, and organizational behavior in aid agencies.[*]

[*] In referring to my own (unpublished) research – e.g. for a fuller explanation of statistical methods than appropriate here – I use "(Author 2014)" to avoid breaching confidentiality. I would, of course, be happy to provide links to this work on request and/or change these citations prior to publication if I am fortunate enough to have my essay selected.

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As a practitioner I frequently found myself working on behalf of developing country governments, sitting across the table from counterparties who represented multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. I was often struck by the fact that the folks who seemed to be doing the best job – who seemed most interested in contributing to national development trajectories, public goods, and citizens' welfare – seemed to be doing good work in conflict with the incentives they faced from their. The organizations' missions were all laudable, and when I met senior leadership of bilateral and multilateral agencies I almost invariably walked away impressed. What was going wrong, then? What stood between good leaders and their agents? Why did the forest of actual development impact so often get lost in the procedural trees?

What Theory Tells Us

While some organizations have special facilities or operational procedures for fragile states or particular tasks, perhaps the most striking feature of the structure of aid organizations is how similarly structured the management of very dissimilar tasks (judicial reform and road construction, say) so often is, and how little these structures change in response to very dissimilar contexts; to whether the road under construction is in China or Chad, Turkey or Timor-Leste. Long-established, foundational work in Organizational Behavior and Management would suggest that whatever optimal management practice might be, it is very unlikely to be the same across tasks and context in this way.

One of the central lessons of these literatures is that context matters for optimal strategy, and that autonomy is a key lever for organizations, public and private. (Carpenter 2001; Huber and Shipan 2002; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967; Wilson 1989) Key in this theoretical literature is uncertainty, with greater environmental volatility (and thus less potential for task routinization) associated with a higher optimal level of agent discretion and autonomy (March and Simon 1958; Perrow 1967; Thompson 1967). In a more uncertain environment, flexibility and autonomy will be more highly prized.

Put another way, if we can measure the right things and incentivize agents to delivery them this is clearly the best possible strategy; economics and contract theory make this abundantly clear. However, this will not always be the case; measurement is more difficult for some tasks than for others. In tasks that are not tractable to output measurement, management by measurement may prove ineffective but nonetheless crowd out the agent autonomy necessary for optimal organizational performance. Measurement leads to greater production of whatever is measured; the question is in some ways one of when that is likely to be a good thing, and when bad. There is, for example, substantial work that suggests that if a job is "multi-task", having both measurable and un-measurable components, measurement will be distortionary, leading to production only of the part of the task that can be observed. (Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole 2000; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991)

The optimal level of autonomy is, then, contingent on features of the task and environment. In the context of international development, Pritchett and Woolcock describe tasks for which discretion may be necessary as those for which

> [d]elivery requires decisions by providers to be made on the basis of information that is important but inherently imperfectly specified and incomplete… the right decision depends on conditions ("states of the world") that are difficult to assess (*ex ante* or *ex post*), and hence it is very difficult to monitor whether or not the right decision is taken (2004, p. 9).

One could imagine a community governance project in rural Afghanistan as such a task; the "correct" implementation would seem to be hard to specify ex-ante and would need to rely on judgments by properly placed agents, judgments which would be difficult to assess from the outside either ex-ante or ex-post. In such an environment, autonomy might prove critical to success. On the other hand, a road construction project in Turkey seems to be a task for which one could imagine clear performance-based measures and a predictable, externally observable sequence of events; measurement of outputs and management from above might well prove the superior strategy.

The difference between these two contexts would seem to be the degree to which tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1966) or soft information is critical to success. Stein defines soft information as

> [i]nformation that cannot be directly verified by anyone other than the agent who produces it. For example, a loan officer who has worked with a small-company president may come to believe that the president is honest and hardworking—in other words, the classic candidate for an unsecured "character loan." Unfortunately, these attributes cannot be unambiguously documented in a report that the loan officer can pass on to his superiors (2002, p. 1892).

In international development implementation, soft information includes (but is not limited to) assessments of ministry personnel and their motivations, how to structure or revise a project to maximize its likelihood of being in the interests of important political actors and thus fully implemented, or simply whether a project under implementation is headed in the right direction. Many things that are hard to codify and communicate up a hierarchy may well be critical to a development project's success.[1]

Autonomy allows field staff to make judgments about program design, management, and revision that rely on soft information; that is, to navigate by judgment. Autonomy also leads to higher-quality staff (who migrate to roles in which they have the power to make decisions) and superior organizational learning. More autonomous agencies can design projects which are more appropriately calibrated and more likely to be "owned" by domestic government actors. Such agencies are more able

[1] This line of argument shares much with a separate literature on observability and top-down control pioneered by James Scott's *Seeing Like a State* and the myriad "Seeing Like…" publications it has spawned. Soft information is, on this view, a first cousin of mētis, which Scott defines as "a wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment" (Scott 1998, p. 313).

to adjust/revise projects when needed and in an appropriate manner and are better able to make more appropriate day-to-day implementation and supervision decisions.[2]

Some types of task are more tractable to measurement and external monitoring than others. If an organization is constructing a building, there are clear standards of output quality that can be observed or contracted on. If an organization is training teachers, it is much harder to develop appropriate short-term output measures against which results can be measured. The notion that tasks are inherently different and pose different measurement challenges is well articulated in the management control systems literature on private sector contexts and is a critical part of some of the most prominent theorizing in the public administration literature on bureaucratic functioning and contracting (Brown and Potoski 2003, 2005; Wilson 1989).

In sum, then, I am arguing that navigation by measurement will be most useful for relatively routine tasks and/or relatively predictable environments where (a) the desired outcomes are verifiable and thus contractible and (b) it is easy to make frequent non-distortionary measurements which will also be stable, avoiding Goodhart's Law problems. Navigation by judgment, on the other hand, will be most useful when (a) tasks are difficult to routinize and/or environments are relatively unpredictable and (b) it is hard to define appropriate targets ex-ante or find good measures.

One of the big reasons organizations measure and engage in hierarchical control is for legitimacy; to 'show results' to a skeptical political authorizing environment or public. (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977) This dynamic has been echoed in the aid literature(Easterly 2002; Eyben 2013), and connected to political authorizing environments and the fight for continued funding and resources (Barnett 2009; Bush 2011; Mcmahon 2001). The judgment-versus-measurement debate is very much a live one in development at the moment, with scholars noting the ongoing debate among practitioners (cf. Gulrajani 2011) and a number of scholars arguing for a more iterative, agent-judgment-driven approach which plans less ex-ante and instead adapts to the soft, contextual information of recipient-country environments (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2012; Barder 2009; Booth 2013; Easterly 2014; Ramalingam 2013).

Criticism constrains what IDOs do and what they imagine themselves capable of doing; as Tendler (1975) puts it regarding USAID:

> It has been generally recognized that criticism of the foreign aid program weakened [USAID] and kept it from doing what it wanted to do. Less understood is the fact that the process of living with criticism profoundly affected what the agency *wanted* to do and what it was capable of doing (p. 40).

Constraints emanating from political authorizing environments change the incentive structure of aid organizations and their agents, shifting them toward navigation by measurement and away from navigation by judgment. It is no surprise, then, that aid organizations often focus on changing what can

[2] The mechanisms by which the incorporation of soft information by autonomous agencies and agents leads to better decisions and more successful development projects are explored in greater depth in qualitative case studies (Author forthcoming).

be easily measured (policy, structures) in recipient countries, at the expense of areas where measurement is more difficult (Andrews 2011; Eyben 2013; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).

There is perhaps no more eloquent description of these dynamics than that of Andrew Natsios, the former head of USAID. Natsios (2010) describes what he calls

> Obsessive Measurement Disorder (OMD), an intellectual dysfunction rooted in the notion that counting everything in government programs (or private industry and increasingly some foundations) will produce better policy choices and improve management… [Relatedly] demands of the oversight committees of Congress for ever more information, more control systems, and more reports have diverted professional USAID (and now MCC) staff from program work to data collection and reporting requirements. (p. 8).

Natsios relates the inappropriateness of measurement directly to the difficulty of measuring outcomes. His prescription is that "USAID should decentralize aid programming and decision making to the lowest possible organizational level, where officers have the greatest knowledge of what is happening on the ground" (p. 72). He also notes that staff are often frustrated by the lack of autonomy and by the "risk aversion" that results from this environment (pp. 57-58).

Variation in the Structure of Aid Organizations

In thinking about the role organizational structure might play in explaining the impact of foreign we can take advantage of differences in the way foreign aid delivery agencies are structured. By looking across aid organizations and seeing if variation in structure is associated with variation in performance, we can start to gather suggestive evidence as to whether organizational structure and management does indeed have an impact on performance. Table 1 below compares two aid organizations, USAID and DFID.

Table 1: Comparison of USAID and DFID's Political Authorizing Environment

	Political status of aid agency head	*Budget security*	*Response to 2008 financial crisis*	*Workplace satisfaction surveys*	*Rank (out of 33) on autonomy measure used in econometric work below*
DFID	Full ministerial rank, limited coordination with Foreign Affairs	Three-year budget allocations; few earmarks	Only ministry spared from across-the-board cuts; budget has continued to increase	Top 2%	3
USAID	Head of USAID (Administrator) reports to State Department	Yearly, often delayed; USAID budget heavily earmarked	Cutting aid-funding promises *literally* the first thing mentioned by Obama ticket (as candidate)	Bottom third	29

Sources: 2012 US Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Global Satisfaction Index (USAID 25th of 36); 2013 UK Civil Service People Survey Employee Engagement Index (DFID tied for 2nd of 98); Biden-Palin Debate, October 2 2008; author.

Do we see, then, differences in performance between these organizations? The short answer is a definitive yes. A few illustrative examples:

In 2006, Liberia was just emerging from two decades of conflict. A strong Minister of Health was looking for international help in improving Liberia's woeful health statistics, among the world's worst.[3] Faced with a ministry that had not produced a financial statement in over a decade and having no idea where funds allocated to the ministry were flowing, the Minister approached the US Agency for International Development (USAID) about establishing an office of financial management. USAID declined. The Minister then approached the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), which was excited by the idea and quickly began to implement it.[4] At a point when it was still too early to measure the new office's performance and generate quantitative data, DFID staff on the ground realized that their mission was not succeeding. They used their judgment that the wrong personnel had been assigned and arranged to have them replaced. Today, the Liberian health ministry's office of financial management is thriving, praised for its professionalism and effectiveness.

In the same country, in the same ministry, both DFID and USAID wished to support the same reform-minded Minister by putting the ministry in greater control of external funding. DFID set in motion the development of a pooled fund—a collective funding mechanism with contributions from multiple donors and a governing board composed of donor and health ministry representatives. While at least some of the critical USAID decision makers would have liked to contribute to the fund, Congressional restrictions prevented USAID from comingling its funds in this way; USAID ultimately set up a parallel system with much higher transaction costs and predetermined performance targets which, due to Liberia's inherent unpredictability, require frequent and costly revision.

In South Africa in the mid-2000s, both USAID and DFID wished to strengthen municipal governments. DFID's primary mode of engagement was to embed flexible advisers in municipal governments and let them guide support over the long term. USAID considered a similar strategy but initially rejected it, in part because it would be difficult to develop consistent measures for these activities. USAID instead initially worked primarily via the delivery of trainings, an approach for which the outputs (such as the number of participants and trainings) could be more easily measured.

This is not to suggest measurement is always the inferior strategy; also in South Africa in the mid-2000's, it is clear that the US Government's PEPFAR response via USAID and CDC with its focus on targets and delivery was (while not without shortcomings, particularly regarding exit strategy and sustainability) quite effective in responding to the AIDS epidemic, much more so than DFID's focus on high-level government strategy.

[3] These accounts come in-person interviews with individuals who were part of these interventions, and will receive fuller treatment in academic work which is still in preparation (Author forthcoming).

[4] Later, following a conversation with the US Ambassador and his intervention, USAID did indeed offer to provide support to establish the unit, though on a much slower timeline than that of DFID.

Quantitative Data and Results

However compelling these accounts may seem – and however useful they may be in understanding the mechanisms of action at play – they cannot aspire to universality, to general claims of relevance to a wide variety of aid agencies. After all, while DFID and USAID may face different political authorizing environments, these are not the only differences between them; additionally, the projects described above may have been outliers, idiosyncratic for one reason or another.

Luckily, we have a much more general data source to draw on in this regard; I examine differential returns to autonomy in a dataset that I compiled of over 14,000 unique projects in 178 counties carried out by nine donor agencies over the past 40+ years.[5] Figure 1 below gives an overview of the distribution of projects by country.

[5] More complete details on data collection methods, econometric specifications, vetting of data quality, results robustness checks available in Author 2014.

Figure 1: Overview of Projects in Dataset



The key dependent variable in the analysis is overall project success, a holistic rating undertaken by independent evaluators (either external evaluation contractors or independent evaluation units) or by project staff in project completion reports. For most IDOs, project success is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 6, with 6 being "Highly Satisfactory" and 1 being "Highly Unsatisfactory."[6]

It would be ideal to have time-varying data on organizational autonomy for every organization, including variation at the country (or even project) level. The data available only varies at the organization level and is time-invariant.[7] This work therefore cannot test directly for the effect of autonomy on success directly, as different organizations have different measurement standards; a rating of 4 given by aid organization A may or may not mean a project is more successful than one that received a rating of 3 from aid organization B. This work can, however, examine the *differential* performance of organizations with varying levels of autonomy in interaction with other explanatory variables, thus leveraging the idea that a rating of 4 given by organization A means a project succeeded more than a project assigned a 3 by organization A.

Figure 2 below (drawn from Author 2014) demonstrates the main findings. Using the State Fragility Index as a measure of environmental unpredictability and an autonomy measure drawn from the Paris Declaration monitoring surveys, an organization with a greater level of autonomy is predicted

[6] These are the World Bank's designations. No agency has significantly different names/standards in this regard, which would in any case be removed by agency fixed effects.

[7] This study's focus on measurement at the organizational level is not intended to suggest there is not recipient and recipient-year variation in autonomy, only that this is the level at which measurement is most clean and broad. Controls below ensure that my results are not biased by these other levels of variation in autonomy.

to have much more consistent performance across countries of varying fragility than an organization with a lower level of autonomy.

Figure 2: Returns to Autonomy in Countries of Differential Environmental Unpredictability



These results are robust to use of a variety of fixed effects (including time and recipient country fixed effects), which should allay any concerns that the results are driven by heterogeneous agency project performance over time or by heterogeneous entry of agencies into and out of recipient countries over time.

We also see differences by OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting Service (CRS) purpose codes, which help us to differentiate between different kinds of tasks. Also drawn from Author 2014, the tables below focus, on the one hand, on purpose codes related to infrastructure construction or observable service delivery (for which we might not expect to see as strong a relationship between autonomy and outcome) and, on the other hand, on purpose codes which focus on related policy or administration tasks but are more difficult to observe. Focusing on related but difficult-to-observe domains helps to ensure that the results are not driven by something like the fact that it is much easier to deliver electricity than to deliver education.

There is no relationship between autonomy in interaction with state fragility and project success in the first set of task domains, where the focus is on constructing something or delivering a tangible and relatively easily monitorable service, but the relationship is relatively strong in related administrative sectors. These results are consistent with my contention that task domain mediates the relationship between project success and environmental unpredictability.

Table 2: Relationship between Autonomy and State Fragility by Sector (Outcomes Easily Observed; Sector by CRS Code)

DV: Project Success (6-pt scale)	(1) Road Infrastructure & Transport	(2) Buliding Power Transmission Lines	(3) Agricultural Irrigation & Water	(4) Basic Drinking Water Supply & Sanitation
State Fragility Index (SFI)	-0.262	0.586*	-0.516	-0.298
	(0.352)	(0.128)	(0.343)	(0.152)
Autonomy*SFI	0.356	-0.958*	0.735	0.386
	(0.561)	(0.201)	(0.536)	(0.233)
Constant	5.010***	5.120***	4.588***	4.621***
	(0.161)	(0.0796)	(0.152)	(0.0486)
IDO Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2-Within	0.030	0.031	0.024	0.054
R^2-Between	0.018	0.263	0.153	0.000
Observations	469	167	165	271

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Relationship between Autonomy and State Fragility by Sector (Outcomes Difficult to Observe; Sector by CRS Code)

DV: Project Success (6-pt scale)	(1) Transportation Management	(2) Agricultural Policy & Administration	(3) Social/Welfare Services (Administration, Capacity Building)	(4) All Administration/ Policy Management
State Fragility Index (SFI)	-1.030***	-0.670***	-0.371***	-0.151***
	(0.0271)	(0.123)	(0.0178)	(0.0125)
Autonomy*SFI	1.716***	0.928**	0.561***	0.192***
	(0.0407)	(0.182)	(0.0305)	(0.0195)
Constant	2.978***	4.587***	4.508***	4.554***
	(0.0266)	(0.246)	(0.0288)	(0.0210)
IDO Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2-Within	0.234	0.077	0.025	0.019
R^2-Between	0.058	0.437	0.031	0.296
Observations	39	55	160	1530

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

This provides further evidence that considering the effects of measurement is critical in determining where measurement is likely to have a negative effect on project success—that is, in harder-to-observe task domains—and where its effects are likely to be more ambiguous and potentially beneficial. Soft information seems to matter to development success, with more autonomous agencies thus better able to manage more unpredictable contexts and task domains less tractable to navigation

by measurement. This suggests that autonomy can have positive effects inasmuch as it provides support for the acquisition and use of soft information.

Implications

While the argument presented here relates specifically to organizational autonomy and measurement, I do not mean to suggest that this is the only dimension on which managerial practices and organizational structure affect project performance, nor that these practices are the only source of variation in project performance or development impact – far from it. I mean for these data to simply instantiate that managerial practices *do* matter; that they are one of the things that contributes to foreign aid project performance. These results suggest that this effect is substantively significant; the data underlying figure 3 above suggests that comparing recipient-country environments one standard deviation above and below the mean, a relatively high-autonomy development organization would see a difference of about .05 points in performance on a six-point scale, while a relatively low-autonomy development organization would see more than 10 times the difference.

Donors like DFID and the World Bank are just the first step in a complicated web of organizations, of course; contractors, implementers, NGOs, and CSOs are all independent organizations that play a critical role in development success and face their own complex web of incentives, including reasons to 'show results' and engage in legitimacy-seeking behavior. We can do more to understand these relationships and the net results of same; where the complex web is optimally oriented towards development impact and where it can be improved.

What's more, this large-N analysis can capture only the tip of the management iceberg. Denizer, Kaufmann, & Kraay (2013) find that Task Team Leaders are critical to explaining World Bank project success; the bottom line is that people matter in development delivery. Just because it is difficult to quantify the effect of good personnel, or measure personnel quality, does not mean that this is not the case; personnel quality, then, is another observable non-verifiable (soft) piece of maximizing the chance of development impact from a foreign aid interaction. Organizational structure and incentives are surely connected to employee entry and exit; who decides to join an aid agency, and who stays in that agency.

We also need to do more to think about the idiosyncratic features of individual sectors, or individual sector-country combinations. The Gambia and Uzbekistan have the same rating on the 2012 State Fragility Index, but this does not mean that the DFID Watsan team visiting Banjul ought be structured, measured, monitored, and incentivized identically to the DFID Watsan team headed to Tashkent.

Organizational Behavior has much to tell us about constructing and incentivizing teams, individuals, and divisions. While those preaching measurement and New Public Management have sensitized development thinkers and practitioners to the need to learn from the private sector, very little actual learning has occurred. Private sector management techniques are sometimes appropriate in the public sector, sometimes not. (Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole 1999; Dixit 1997, 2002; Wilson 1989) Where private sector techniques make sense, they are much more than simply measuring performance as a means to achieve results. Where these techniques are less appropriate, we need to think

systematically about what might suit better, drawing from a rich literature in public management in doing so.

Conclusion

Organizational design is the "low-hanging fruit" of international development, the factor in development outcomes arguably most changeable by Western governments and polities. By the estimate of one interviewee with long experience at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), approximately 30% of all staff time is spent on measurement design and reporting (Interviews). For fiscal year 2013, this works out to approximately $350 million;[8] if a move towards more navigation by judgment and less navigation by output measurement were to reduce this figure by even 25%, the administrative savings—not to mention the efficiency gains from greater impact of UNDP's nearly nine billion dollars in annual development spending—would be quite significant. Optimal design will not ensure that foreign aid is universally successful, but it will ensure that those features that are wholly under the control of donor countries are calibrated so as to give aid the best chance to realize maximum impact.

In submitting this essay to the GDN Next Horizons Essay Contest I am aware, of course, that a key partner - the Gates Foundation – is often associated with the push towards measurement in development. I would be the last to suggest that to the extent the Gates Foundation has pushed towards measurement it has not been positive, has not contributed to net welfare. In fact, I would argue that the need to consider the nature of the task and environment in deciding what to measure is very much in keeping with the Gates vision. In his 2013 Annual Letter, Bill Gates highlights the development impact of measuring vaccine transmission and coverage rates rather than simply sending out health personnel to conduct vaccine drives. (Gates 2013) He also, however, seems to implicitly endorse this work's conditional view that measurement's role depends on its ability to provide timely, appropriate, non-distortionary feedback in saying "You can achieve amazing progress if you set a clear goal and find a measure that will drive progress toward that goal" (ibid, p.1), which seems to imply that a well-aligned measure is a necessary condition for measurement to be optimally beneficial.

Where output measurement and tight control by distant principals work well, management by measurement should be used to better deliver vaccines or more efficiently build electricity transmission infrastructure. But many of the environments in which organizations most seek profit or impact could be described as unfamiliar, unpredictable, or both; the effect of output measurement and tight control in these contexts may not be positive.

In the contexts where aid has the potential to make the most difference—in the most fragile states—measurement is the least useful; rather, navigation by judgment is the optimal strategy. My findings suggest that not only are we not doing all we can to improve aid delivery, the move towards measurement and control across all aid sectors in recent years may actually be making things worse in some sectors. Measurement may lead to the construction of many successful dams but leave recipient countries without the capacity building necessary to manage and maintain those dams or to put the

[8] This is drawn from UNDP's estimates of administrative and policy coordination cost (United Nations Development Programme 2013, p. 6).

electricity to use. If our drive for results leads us to control aid too tightly, we may end up accomplishing precisely the opposite of what we intend.

More generally, we need to start thinking more systematically and deeply about how to manage development projects for results. The answers will not be simple; economics Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom found international development such a complicated and fascinating question of institutions and incentives that she and her team used in part their own funds to conduct an analysis of the Swedish development agency, SIDA. (Ostrom, Gibson, and Shivakumar 2002) But there is evidence-based research from which to draw. This is a collective project that we need to undertake beginning today, with funding and attention directed toward thinking through management challenges and incentive problems coupled with aid organizations willing to experiment with altered practices to confirm these altered practices work when the proverbial rubber hits the road. There is good reason to think that thinking through management, organizational structure, and incentives and piloting new practices is truly where the Value for Money lies in foreign aid delivery.

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